The EBA virtual IBAN report is the European Banking Authority's first systematic look at how payment providers issue virtual IBANs, and its headline finding is uncomfortable for anyone who relies on one: across the EU, nobody agrees on what a virtual IBAN legally is. That disagreement is not academic. It decides who checks your identity, whether you hold a payment account at all, and which protection, if any, applies to the money that lands in it. Most coverage of the report is written by law firms for banks. This guide reads it from the other side of the counter: you are a business with a vIBAN on your invoices, and you want to know what the regulator found and what to ask your provider. ## What the EBA virtual IBAN report is The report, reference EBA/Rep/2024/08, was released on 24 May 2024 after a fact-finding exercise carried out during 2023 and 2024. It followed the EBA's July 2023 Opinion on money laundering risks, which had already flagged vIBANs as a concern. The evidence base is broad for a regulatory report. According to the report itself, the EBA surveyed national competent authorities, interviewed supervisors on specific business models, held bilateral interviews and round tables with more than 20 payment service providers (banks, payment institutions and e-money institutions), and took input from the European Commission and Europol. The official summary is blunt. The industry issues vIBANs in different ways and for different purposes, national authorities diverge in interpreting the rules, and the full extent of vIBAN issuance across Member States is currently not known. The divergences span four bodies of EU law: the Anti Money Laundering Directive, the Payment Services Directive, the Capital Requirements Directive and the SEPA Regulation. ## How the EBA defines a virtual IBAN It does not, because it cannot. The report opens by noting there is no legal definition of vIBANs at EU level. Instead it lists characteristics common to most of what it saw: - A vIBAN has the same format and functionality as a regular IBAN.
- •It is linked to a payment account the EBA calls the master account, which has its own, different IBAN.
- •All incoming payments to the vIBAN are credited directly to that master account.
- •In some set-ups the vIBAN can also be used to pay third parties, with the money debited from the master account. The detail that matters most for a business: to third parties, a vIBAN is typically indistinguishable from a regular IBAN. The payer's provider cannot tell it is virtual and will not know which master account the money actually goes to. If you want the routing mechanics first, we explain how a virtual IBAN works separately. ### The master account behind every vIBAN The report identifies two ways the master account can be held. It can be in the name of the vIBAN's end user, or in the name of another entity that allocates vIBANs to its customers. In the second case, the EBA notes, the master account might be held at a bank in the name of a payment or e-money institution and also serve as that institution's safeguarding account. That single fork drives most of the risks below. Whether the account is in your name or your provider's is the first question to ask, and it is the same question that decides what a payer's name check returns, which we covered in our guide to the named virtual IBAN. ## The use cases the EBA found The EBA identified six common ways providers, or entities partnering with a provider, offer vIBANs, while warning the list may not be complete. The purposes it describes will be familiar to any finance team: - Reconciliation. Companies assign a separate vIBAN to each customer, project or business line so incoming payments match themselves. One example in the report: a payment institution gives a merchant one vIBAN per customer, so refunds or payouts go back to the same account the customer paid from.
- •A local country code. Businesses and consumers use a vIBAN with a given Member State's country code to get around IBAN discrimination, where a payer refuses an IBAN from another country.
- •Top up only. Some banks and e-money institutions issue vIBANs that can do nothing except fund the customer's own account, or return money on redemption.
- •Branch issuance. A provider with a branch in a host country issues vIBANs carrying that country's code while the master account is held and serviced from its home country, sometimes with the branch doing little beyond vIBAN issuance. The EBA does not condemn any of these. It says the legitimacy of each business model should be assessed case by case, in cooperation with the competent authority, before it is launched. ## The 10 risks, grouped for a business reader The report lists ten risks for institutions, supervisors and users. Here they are clustered by who carries them. ### Regulatory arbitrage and divergence Supervisors disagree on whether issuing a vIBAN with another Member State's code requires a branch there, and on whether an IBAN must always map one to one to a payment account. The core of the disagreement is whether a vIBAN is an account in itself or merely a secondary identifier for the master account. Different answers in different countries create an uneven playing field and room for arbitrage. Paytechlaw adds that the EBA also saw a risk of vIBANs being used by non-EU financial institutions or EU non-PSPs to provide payment services without the required authorisation. ### Money laundering visibility If the end user is not the master account holder, the bank servicing that account, and the payer's bank, may not know who the end user is. Transaction monitoring then runs on information that may not be reliable. Providers also told the EBA they are not always sure which national financial intelligence unit should receive a suspicious transaction report: the one matching the vIBAN's country code or the one where the master account sits. And because vIBANs obscure where the master account is, they can make tracing harder for law enforcement. ### Risks to end users who do not hold the master account This is the finding that should matter most to a business. Where you are not the master account holder, you may not have a payment account within the meaning of PSD2, and so you may not benefit from all the safeguards and rights PSD2 attaches to having one. Supervisors also disagree on how to classify the service in that situation. The report further flags an uneven application of the verification of payee service introduced by the Instant Payments Regulation where the payee using a vIBAN is not the master account holder. ### Transparency and deposit protection The EBA found a lack of transparency on key information such as complaints procedures, and cases of inappropriate disclosure about which deposit guarantee scheme protects a user's deposits. Two more technical risks round out the ten: divergent reporting of transactions under PSD2 when the vIBAN and master account carry different country codes, and supervisors' lack of visibility on how many vIBANs are issued in their jurisdiction at all. ## What the AMLR changes The EU's new Anti Money Laundering Regulation answers part of the report. It gives vIBANs their first legal definition for anti money laundering purposes: "an identifier causing payments to be redirected to a payment account identified by an IBAN different from that identifier." It also adds identification duties. Paytechlaw points to Article 22(3) of Regulation 2024/1624, under which the entity issuing vIBANs must be able to identify the people using them. The EBA notes a matching duty on the institution servicing the master account: it must be able to obtain information on vIBAN end users, even when another institution issued them, without delay and within no more than five working days. Stibbe cautions that this regime does not apply until mid-2027. Beyond the AMLR, the report's suggestions are recommendations, not rules. They include clarifying the definition of a payment account and whether vIBAN users who are not master account holders have one; supervisors checking that users are told which deposit guarantee scheme covers them; and, as PwC summarises, possibly requiring SEPA payment messages to carry information about the end user, building on the ISO 20022 "ultimate debtor" and "ultimate creditor" fields. ## What it means if your business uses a vIBAN Read as a user, the report is a list of questions your provider should be able to answer in writing. Ours are below too, because the report's own point is that labels hide structure. 1. Whose name is on the master account? Yours, or the provider's? This decides most of what follows.
- •Do I hold a payment account, or just an identifier? The EBA flagged that end users without the master account may fall outside PSD2 rights.
- •What protects my balance? Ask for the specific regime, not a slogan. In the UK, money held with a payment institution or e-money institution is not covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme; protection comes from safeguarding.
- •Which country code is on my IBAN, and where is the money really held? A mismatch is legal in many set-ups, but you should know it.
- •How will my identity reach the master account bank? Under the AMLR that information must be available within five working days. A provider should already know how it will meet that.
- •What will an EU payer's name check return? If the answer is your provider's name, expect questions from clients' accounts payable teams. Here are our answers on the points we can state precisely. EXFI is a trading name of EX Financial Solutions Ltd, which is not itself authorised or regulated by the FCA and acts as a distributor of payment services provided by Gemba Finance Limited, FCA FRN 804853. Regulated payment services are for UK customers only. EXFI accounts are payment accounts, not bank accounts; they are not FSCS covered, and funds are safeguarded in segregated accounts under the Payment Services Regulations 2017. Accounts hold balances in GBP, EUR, USD and more than a dozen other currencies, each with its own dedicated IBAN where applicable. What sits behind a provider's licence is its own subject, covered in our guide to the authorised payment institution, and the trade offs between dedicated versus virtual IBANs have their own article. None of this is legal advice. The report itself says how vIBANs are treated still varies by country, so if your structure crosses borders, ask the provider which supervisor's view it relies on. ## FAQ Is the EBA virtual IBAN report binding? No. It is a report built from a fact-finding exercise. Its suggestions signal what EU supervisors expect, but the binding change comes from legislation such as the AMLR, not from the report. Does the EBA say virtual IBANs should be banned? No. It acknowledges benefits such as easier reconciliation and avoiding IBAN discrimination, and asks that each business model be assessed case by case with the competent authority. Can a payer tell that an IBAN is virtual? Usually not. The report notes a vIBAN looks and works like a regular IBAN, so the payer's provider cannot tell it is virtual or see which master account receives the funds. Does the report apply to UK businesses? It is an EU authority report on EU law, so it does not regulate UK firms directly. It still reaches them whenever an EU bank, payment provider or payer sits on the other side of a vIBAN transaction.
